Back in the 1990s, it was fashionable to complain about what Hubert Vedrine, then the French foreign minister, called American hyperpuissance, or “hyperpower.” The left-leaning diplomat believed the “question at the center of the world’s current powers” was the United States’ “domination of attitudes, concepts, language and modes of life.” What was needed, he argued, was a “balanced multipolarism,” which might counteract American “unilateralism,” “unipolarism” and “uniformity.”
With President Trump, Vedrine has finally gotten his wish, though probably not in the way he would have imagined, much less liked.
It isn’t exactly easy to make sense of the Trump administration’s foreign policy after its first bombastic weeks in office. Does it have a governing concept, beyond a taste for drama and the assertion, based on scant evidence, that this or that neighbor or ally has treated us “very unfairly”?
In an intriguing guest essay in The Times this week, Rutgers University historian Jennifer Mittelstadt made the case that Trump was a “sovereigntist,” a tradition she dated to 1919 and the Republican rejection, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, of U.S. membership in the League of Nations. Sovereigntists, she noted, also looked askance at U.S. membership in NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and especially the Carter administration’s decision to relinquish the Panama Canal.
That seems about right. Sovereigntism means a country doing what it wants to do within only the limits of what it can do. It means the end of self-restraint within a framework of mutual restraint. It means an indifference to the behavior of other states, however cruel or dangerous, so long as it doesn’t impinge on us. It means a reversion to the notorious claim, uttered (according to Thucydides) by the Athenians before their sacking of the neutral city of Melos, that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
Read the rest here.
No comments:
Post a Comment