Cur Deus Homo?

The Motive of the Incarnation

-Archpriest G. Florovsky

"I am the Alpha and the Omega." (Rev. 1:8)

I.

The Christian message was from the very beginning the message of Salvation, and accordingly our Lord was depicted primarily as the Savior, Who has redeemed His people from bondage of sin and corruption. The very fact of the Incarnation was usually interpreted in early Christian theology in the perspective of Redemption. Erroneous conceptions of the Person of Christ with which the early Church had to wrestle were criticized and refuted precisely when they tended to undermine the reality of human Redemption. It was generally assumed that the very meaning of Salvation was that the intimate union between God and man had been restored, and it was inferred that the Redeemed had to belong Himself to both sides, i.e. to be at once both Divine and human, for otherwise the broken communion between God and man would not have been re-established. This was the main line of reasoning of St. Athanasius in his struggle with the Arians, of St. Gregory of Nazianzus in his refutation of Apollinarianism, and of other writers of the IVth and Vth centuries. "That is saved which is united with God," says St. Gregory of Nazianzus.1 The redeeming aspect and impact of the Incarnation were emphatically stressed by the Fathers. The purpose and the effect of the Incarnation were defined precisely as the Redemption of man and his restoration to those original conditions which were destroyed by the fall and sin. The sin of the world was abrogated and taken away by the Incarnate One, and He only, being both Divine and human, could have done it. On the other hand, it would be unfair to claim that the Fathers regarded this redeeming purpose as the only reason for the Incarnation, so that the Incarnation would not have taken place at all, had not man sinned. In this form the question was never asked by the Fathers. The question about the ultimate motive of the Incarnation was never formally discussed in the Patristic Age. The problem of the relation between the mystery of the Incarnation and the original purpose of Creation was not touched upon by the Fathers; they never elaborated this point systematically. "It may perhaps be truly said that the thought of an Incarnation independent of the Fall harmonizes with the general tenor of Greek theology. Some patristic phrases seem to imply that the thought was distinctly realized here and there, and perhaps discussed."2 These ‘patristic phrases’ were not collected and examined. In fact, the same Fathers could be quoted in favor of opposite opinions. It is not enough to accumulate quotations, taking them out of their context and ignoring the purpose, very often polemical, for which particular writings were composed. Many of these ‘patristic phrases’ were just ‘occasional’ statements, and they can be used only with utter care and caution. Their proper meaning can be ascertained only when they are read in the context, Le. in the perspective of the thought of each particular writer.

II.

Rupert of Deutz (d. 1135) seems to be the first among the medieval theologians who formally raised the question of the motive of the Incarnation, and his contention was that the Incarnation belonged to the original design of Creation and was therefore independent of the Fall. Incarnation was, in his interpretation, the consummation of the original creative purpose of God, an aim in itself, and not merely a redemptive remedy for human failure.3 Honorius of Autun (d. 1152) was of the same conviction.4 The great doctors of the XHIth century, such as Alexander of Hales and Albert Magnus, admitted the idea of an Incarnation independent of the Fall as a most convenient solution of the problem.5 Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) elaborated the whole conception with great care and logical consistency. For him the Incarnation apart from the Fall was not merely a most convenient assumption, but rather an indispensable doctrinal presupposition. The Incarnation of the Son of God was for him the very reason of the whole Creation. Otherwise, he thought, this supreme action of God would have been something merely accidental or ‘occasional’. "Again, if the Fall were the cause of the predestination of Christ, it would follow that God’s greatest work was only occasional, for the glory of all will not be so intense as that of Christ, and it seems unreasonable to think that God would have foregone such a work because of Adam’s good deed, if he had not sinned." The whole question for Duns Scotus was precisely that of the order of Divine ‘predestination’ or purpose, i.e. of the order of thoughts in the Divine counsel of Creation. Christ, the Incarnate, was the first object of the creative will of God, and it was for Christ’s sake that anything else had been created at all. "The Incarnation of Christ was not foreseen occasionally, but was viewed as an immediate end by God from eternity; thus, in speaking about things which are predestined, Christ in human nature was predestined before others, since He is nearer to an end." This order of ‘purposes’ or ‘previsions’ was, of course, just a logical one. The main emphasis of Duns Scotus was on the unconditional and primordial character of the Divine decree of the Incarnation, seen in the total perspective of Creation.6 Aquinas (1224-1274) also discussed the problem at considerable length. He saw the whole weight of the arguments in favor of the opinion that, even apart from the Fall, "nevertheless, God would have become incarnate," and he quoted the phrase of St. Augustine: "in the Incarnation of Christ, other things must be considered besides absolution from sin." (De Trinitate, XIII. 17). But Aquinas could not find, either in Scripture or in the Patristic writings, any definite witness to this Incarnation independent of the Fall, and therefore was inclined to believe that the Son of God would not have been incarnate if the first man did not sin: "Although God could have become incarnate without the existence of sin, it is nevertheless more appropriate to say that, if man had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate, since in Sacred Scripture the reason for the Incarnation is everywhere given as the sin of the first man." The unfathomable mystery of the Divine will can be comprehended by man only in so far as it is plainly attested in Holy Scripture, "only to the extent that [these things] are transmitted in Sacred Scripture," or, as Aquinas says in another place, "only in so far as we are informed by the authority of the saints, through whom God has revealed His will." Christ alone knows the right answer to this question: "The truth of the matter only He can know, Who was born and Who was offerred up, because He so willed."7 Bonaventura (1221-1274) suggested the same caution. Comparing the two opinions — one in favor of an Incarnation apart from the Fall and the other dependent on it, he concluded: "Both [opinions] excite the soul to devotion by different considerations: the first, however, more consonant with the judgment of reason; yet it appears that the second is more agreeable to the piety of faith." One should rely rather on the direct testimony of the Scriptures than on the arguments of human logic.8 On the whole, Duns Scotus was followed by the majority of theologians of the Franciscan order, and also by not a few outside it, as, for instance, by Dionysius Carthusianus, by Gabriel Biel, by John Wessel, and, in the time of the Council of Trent, by Giacomo Nachianti, Bishop of Chiozza (Jacobus Naclantus), and also by some of the early Reformers, for instance, by Andreas Osiander.9 This opinion was strongly opposed by others, and not only by the strict Thomists, and the whole problem was much discussed both by Roman Catholic and by Protestant theologians in the XVIIth century.10 Among the Roman Catholic champions of the absolute decree of the Incarnation one should mention especially Fran£ois de Sales and Malebranche. Malebranche strongly insisted on the meta-phycical necessity of the Incarnation, quite apart from the Fall, for otherwise, he contended, there would have been no adequate reason or purpose for the act of Creation itself.11 The controversy is still going on among Roman Catholic theologians, sometimes with excessive heat and vigor, and the question is not settled.12 Among the Anglicans, in the last century, Bishop Wescott strongly pleaded for the ‘absolute motive’, in his admirable essay on "The Gospel of Creation."13 The late Father Sergii Bulgakov was strongly in favor of the opinion that the Incarnation should be regarded as an absolute decree of God, prior to the catastrophe of the Fall.14

III.

In the course of this age-long discussion a constant appeal has been made to the testimony of the Fathers. Strangely enough, the most important item has been overlooked in this anthology of quotations. Since the question of the motive of the Incarnation was never formally raised in the Patristic age, most of the texts used in the later discussions could not provide any direct guidance.15 St. Maximus the Confessor (580-662) seems to be the only Father who was directly concerned with the problem, although not in the same setting as the later theologians in the West. He stated plainly that the Incarnation should be regarded as an absolute and primary purpose of God in the act of Creation. The nature of the Incarnation, of this union of the Divine majesty with human frailty, is indeed an unfathomable mystery, but we can at least grasp the reason and the purpose of this supreme mystery, its logos and skopos. And this original reason, or the ultimate purpose, was, in the opinion of St. Maximus, precisely the Incarnation itself and then our own incorporation into the Body of the Incarnate One. The phrasing of St. Maximus is straight and clear. The 60th questio ad Thalassium, is a commentary on I Peter, 1:19-20: "[Christ was] like a blameless and spotless lamb, who was foreordained from the foundation of the world." Now the question is: St. Maximus first briefly summarizes the true teaching about the Person of Christ, and then proceeds: "This is the blessed end, on account of which everything was created. This is the Divine purpose, which was thought of before the beginning of Creation, and which we call an intended fulfillment. All creation exists on account of this fulfillment and yet the fulfillment itself exists because of nothing that was created. Since God had this end in full view, he produced the natures of things. This is truly the fulfillment of Providence and of planning. Through this there is a recapitulation to God of those created by Him. This is the mystery circumscribing all ages, the awesome plan of God, super-infinite and infinitely pre-existing the ages. The Messenger, who is in essence Himself the Word of God, became man on account of this fulfillment. And it may be said that it was He Himself Who restored the manifest innermost depths of the goodness handed down by the Father; and He revealed the fulfillment in Himself, by which creation has won the beginning of true existence. For on account of Christ, that is to say the mystery concerning Christ, all time and that which is in time have found the beginning and the end of their existence in Christ. For before time there was secretly purposed a union of the ages, of the determined and the Indeterminate, of the measurable and the Immeasurable, of the finite and Infinity, of the creation and the Creator, of motion and rest — a union which was made manifest in Christ during these last times." (M., P.G., XC, 621, A-B.) One has to distinguish most carefully between the eternal being of the Logos, in the bosom of the Holy Trinity, and the ‘economy’ of His Incarnation. ‘Prevision’ is related precisely to the Incarnation: "Therefore Christ was foreknown, not as He was according to His own nature, but as he later appeared incarnate for our sake in accordance with the final economy." (M., P.G., XC, 624D). The ‘absolute predestination’ of Christ is alluded to with full clarity.16 This conviction was in full agreement with the general tenor of the theological system of St. Maximus, and he returns to the problem on many occasions, both in his answers to Thalassius and in his Ambigua. For instance, in connection with Ephesians 1:9, St. Maximus says: "[By this Incarnation and by our age] he has shown us for what purpose we were made and the greatest good will be of God towards us before the ages." (M., P.G., 1097C). By his very constitution man anticipates in himself "the great mystery of the Divine purpose," the ultimate consummation of all things in God. The whole history of Divine Providence is for St. Maximus divided into two great periods: the first culminates in the Incarnation of the Logos and is the story of Divine condescension ("through the Incarnation"); the second is the story of human ascension into the glory of deification, an extension, as it were, of the Incarnation to the whole creation. "Therefore we may divide time into two parts according to its design, and we may distinguish both the ages pertaining to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine, and the ages concerning the deification of the human by grace… and to say it concisely: both those ages which concern the descent of God to men, and those which have begun the ascent of men to God… Or, to say it even better, the beginning, the middle, and the end of all the ages, those which have gone by, those of the present time, and those which are yet to come, is our Lord Jesus Christ." (M., P.G., XC, 320, B-C). The ultimate consummation is linked in the vision of St. Maximus with the primordial creative will and purpose of God, and therefore his whole conception is strictly ‘theocentric’, and at the same time ‘Christocentric’. In no sense, however, does this obscure the sad reality of sin, of the utter misery of sinful existence. The great stress is always laid by St. Maximus on the conversion and cleansing of the human will, on the struggle with passions and with evil. But he views the tragedy of the Fall and the apostasy of the created in the wider perspective of the original plan of Creation.17

IV.

What is the actual weight of the witness of St. Maximus ? Was it more than his ‘private opinion,’ and what is the authority of such Opinions’? It is perfectly clear that to the question of the first or ultimate ‘motive’ of the Incarnation no more than a ‘hypothetical’ (or ‘convenient’) answer can be given. But many doctrinal statements are precisely such hypothetical statements or ‘theologoumena’.18 And it seems that the ‘hypothesis’ of an Incarnation apart from the Fall is at least permissible in the system of Orthodox theology and fits well enough into the mainstream of Patristic teaching. An adequate answer to the question of the ‘motive’ of the Incarnaion can be given only in the context of the general doctrine of Creation.



Notes and References

l. Epist. 101, ad Cledoniutn (M., P.G., 37, col. 118).

2. Bishop B. F. Westcott, "The Gospel of Creation," in The Epistles of St. John, The Greek Text with notes and essays, Third Edition. (Macmillan, 1892), p. 288.

8. Rupertus Tuitensis, De Gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaeum, lib. 13, (M., P.L., 148, col. 1628): "Here it is first proper to ask whether or not the Son of God, Whom this discourse concerns, would have become man, even if sin, on account of which all die, had not intervened. There is no doubt that He would not have become mortal and assumed a mortal body if sin had not occurred and caused man to become mortal; only an infidel could be ignorant as to this. The question is: would this have occurred, and would it somehow have been necessary for mankind that God become man, the Head and King of all, as He now is? What will be the answer?" Rupert then quotes from St. Augustine about the eternal predestination of the saints (De Civitate Dei, 14. 23.) and continues: "Since, with regard to the saints and all the elect there is no doubt but that they will all be found, up to the number appointed in God's plan, about which He says in blessing, before sin, 'Increase and multiply,' and it is absurd to think that sin was necessary in order to obtain that number, what must be thought about the very Head and King of all the elect, angels and men, but that He had indeed no necessary cause for becoming man, but that His love's 'delights were to be with the children of men.' [Proverbs 8:31]" Cf. also De Glorificatione Trinitatis, lib. 3. 20 (M., P.L., 169, col. 72): "Therefore, we say quite probably, not so much that man [was made] to make up the number of the angels [i.e., for those who had fallen], but that both angels and men were made because of one man, Jesus Christ, so that, as He Himself was begotten God from God, and was to be found a man, He would have a family prepared on both sides. .. From the beginning, before God made anything, it was in His plan that the Word {Logos} of God, God the Word [Logos], would be made flesh, and dwell among men with great love and the deepest humility, which are His true delights." (Allusion again to Proverbs 8:31.)

4. Honorius of Autun, Libellus octo quaestionum de angelis et homine, cap. 2 (Μ., P.L., 172, col. 72): "And therefore the first man's sin was not the cause of Christ's Incarnation; rather, it was the cause of death and damnation. The cause of Christ's Incarnation was the predestination of human deification. It was indeed predestined by God from all eternity that man would be deified, for the Lord said, 'Father, Thou hast loved them* before the creation of the world,' [cf. John 17:24] those, that is, who are deified through Me... It was necessary, therefore, for Him to become incarnate, so that man could be deified, and thus it does not follow that sin was the cause of His Incarnation, but it follows all the more logically that sin could not alter God's plan for deifying man; since in fact both the authority of Sacred Scripture and clear reason declare that God would have assumed man even had man never sinned. [*S. Script., Jn. 17:24, reads 'me' for 'them'."]

5. Alexander Halensis, Summa tkeologica, ed. ad. Claras Aquas, dist. 3, qu. 3, m. 3; Albertus Magnus, In 3, 1. Sententiarum, dist. 20, art. 4, ed. Borgnet, t. 28, 361: "On this question it must be said that the solution is uncertain, but insofar as I can express an opinion, I believe that the Son of God would have been made man, even if sin had never been."

6. Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, 3, dist. 19, ed. Wadding, t. 7, p. 415. Cf. Reportata Parisiensia, lib. 3, dist. 7, qu. 4, schol. 2, ed. Wadding, t. 11. 1, p. 451. "I say, nevertheless, that the Fall is not the cause of Christ's predestination. Indeed, even if one angel had not fallen, or one man, Christ would still have been predestined thus—even if others had not been created, but only Christ. This I demonstrate thus: anyone who wills methodically first wills an end, and then more immediately, those things which are more immediate to the end. But God wills most methodically; therefore, He wills thus: first He wills Himself, and everything intrinsic to Himself; more directly, so far as concerns things extrinsic, is the soul of Christ. Therefore, in relation to whatever merit and before whatever dement was foreseen, He foresees that Christ must be united to Him in a substantial union... The disposition and predestination is first complete concerning the elect, and then something is done concerning the reprobate, as a secondary act, lest anyone rejoice as if the loss of another was a reward for himself; therefore, before the foreseen Fall, and before any demerit, the whole process concerning Christ was foreseen... Therefore, I say thus: first, God loves Himself; second, He loves Himself by others, and this love of His is pure; third, He wills that He be loved by another, one who can love Him to the highest degree (in speaking about the love of someone extrinsic); fourth, He foresees the union of that nature which ought to love Him to the highest degree, although none had fallen [i.e., even if no one had fallen] ... and, therefore, in the fifth instance, He sees a coming mediator who will suffer and redeem His people; He would not have come as a mediator, to suffer and to redeem, unless someone had first sinned, unless the glory of the flesh had become swelled with pride, unless something needed to be redeemed; otherwise, He would have immediately been the whole Christ glorified." The same reasoning is in the Opus Oxoniensey dist. 7, qu. 3, scholium 3, Wadding 202. See P. Raymond, "Duns Scot," in Dictionnaire de la Theologie Catholique, t.4, col. 1890-1891, and his article, "Le Motif de l'lncarnation: Duns Scot et l'ficole scotiste," in Etudes Franciscaines (1912); also R. ieeberg, Die Tbeologie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Leipzig, 1900), s. 250.

7. Summa theol, 3a, qu. 1, art. 3; in 3 Sentent., dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 3.

8. Bonaventura, in 3 Sentent., dist. 1, qu. 2, ed. Lugduni (1668), pp. 10-12.

9. Cf. A. Michele, "Incarnation," in Dictionnaire de la Theologie Catholique, t. 7, col. 1495 ss. John Wessel, De causis Incarnationis, lib. 2, c. 7, quoted by G. Ullman, Die Reformatoren vor der Reformation, Bd. 2 (Gotha, 1866), s. 398 ff. On Naclantus see Westcott, op. cit., p. 312 ff. Andreas Osiander, An Filius Dei fuit incarnatus, si peccatum non inter-vents set in mundum? Item de imagine Dei quid sit? Ex cert is et evidentibus S. Scripturae testimoniis et non ex philosophicis et humanae rationis cogitationibus derompta explicatio (Monte Regia Prussiae, 1550); see I. A. Dorner, Entivicklun gsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, 2 Aufl. (1853), Bd. 2, s. 438 ff. and 584; Otto Ritschl, Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus, Bd. 2 (Leipzig, 1912), s. 462. Osiander was vigorously criticized by Calvin, Institutio, lib. 2, cap. 12, 4-7, ed. Tholuck, 1, s. 304-309.

10. See for instance the long discussion in "Dogmata Theologica" of L. Thomassin (1619-1695) in tomus 3, De Incamatione Verbi Dei, 2, cap 5 to 11, ed. nova (Parisiis, 1866), pp. 189-249. Thomassin dismisses the Scotist theory as just a "hallucination," contradicted openly by the evidence of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers. He gives a long list of Patristic passages, mainly from St. Augustine. Bellarmin (1542-1621) dismisses this idea in one phrase: "For if Adam had remained in that innocence wherein he had been created, doubtless the Son of God would not have suffered; He probably would not even have assumed human flesh, as even Calvin himself teaches"; De Christo, lib. 5, cap. 10, editio prima Romana (Romae, 1832), t. 1, p. 432. Petavius (1583-1652) was little interested in the controversy: "This question is widely and very contentiously disputed in the schools, but, being removed from the controversy, we will explain it in a few words." There is no evidence for this conception in Tradition, and Petavius gives some few quotations to the opposite effect. "Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus," tomus 4, De Incamatione, lib. 2, cap. 17, 7-12, ed. (Venetiis, 1757), pp. 95-96. On the Protestant side see a brief discussion in John Gerhard, Loci Theologici, Locus Quartus, "De Persona et Officio Christi," cap. 7, with valuable references to the earlier literature and an interesting set of Patristic quotations; ed. Sd. Preuss (Berolini, 1863), t. 1, pp. 513-514, and a longer one in J. A. Quenstedt, Theologia Didactico—Polemica, sive $y sterna Theologicum (Wittebergae, 1961), Pars 3 & 4, Pars 3, Cap. 3, Membrum 1, Sectio 1, Quaestio 1, pp. 108-116. On the other hand, Suarez (1548-1617) advocated a recon-ciliatory view in which both conflicting opinions could be kept together. See his comments on Summa, 3a, Disput. 4, sectio 12, and the whole Disp. 5a, Opera Omnia, ed. Berton (Parisiis, I860), pp. 186-266.

11. Frangois de Sales, Traite de Vamour de Dieu, Iivre 2, ch. 4 and 5, in Oeuvres, edition complete, t. 4 (Annecy, 1894), pp. 99ss. and 102ss. Malebranche, Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et sur la Religion, Edition critique par Armand Cuvillier (Paris, 1948), tome 2, Entretien 9, 6, p. 14: "Oui assurement l'lncarnation du Verbe est le premier et le principal des desseins de Dieu; c'est ce qui justifie sa conduite"; Traite de la Nature et de la Grace (Rotterdam, 1712), Discours 1, 1, p. 2. Seconde Eclaircissement, p. 3O2ss.; Reflexions sur la Promotion Physique (Paris, 1715), p. 300: "II suit evidemment, ce me semble, de ce que je viens de dire, que le premier et le principal dessein de Dieu dans la creation, est 1'Incarnation du Verbe: puisque Jesus Christ est le premier en toutes choses. . . et qu'ainsi, quand 1'homme n'aurait point peche, le Verbe se serait incarne"; cf. p. 211 and passim. See for further information: J. Vidgrain, Le Christianisme dans la philosophie de Maleranche (Paris, 1923), pp. 99ss. and 112ss; H. Gouhier, La Philosophie de Malebranche et son Experience Religieuse (Paris, 1926), p. 22ss.; J. Maydieu, "La Creation du Monde et 1'Incarnation du Verbe dans la Philosophie de Malebranche," in Bulletin de Litterature Ecclesiastique (Toulouse, 1935). It is of interest to mention that Leibniz also regarded the Incarnation as an absolute purpose in creation; see quotations from his unpublished papers in J. Baruzi, Leibniz et I Organization religieuse de la Terre (Paris, 1907), pp. 273-274.

12. The Scotist point of view has been presented by a Franciscan, Father Chrysostome, in his two books: Christus Alpha et Omega, seu de Christi universali regno (Lille, 1910, published without the name of the author) and Le Motif de 1'Incarnation et les principaux thomistes contemporains (Tours, 1921). The latter was a reply to the critics in which he assembled an impressive array of Patristic texts. The Thomist point of view was taken by Father E. Hogon, Le Mystere de Vlncarnation (Paris, 1913), p. 63ss., and Father Paul Galtier, S. J. De Incarnatione et Redemptione (Parisiis, 1926); see also Father Hilair de Paris, Cur Deus Homo? Dissertario de motivo Incarnationis (Lyons, 1867) [includes an analysis of Patristic texts from the Thomist point of view]. Cf. also the introduction in the book of Dr. Aloysius Spindler, Cur Verbum, caro factum? Das Motiv der Menschiverdung und das Verhaltnis der Erlosung zur Menschwerdung in den christologischen Glaubenskdmpfen des vierten und funten christlichen Jahrhunderts (Paderborn, 1938) ['Torschungen zur christlichen Literatur— und Dogmengeschichte," hsgg. von A. Ehrhard und Dr. J. P. Kirsch, Bd. 18, 2 Heft].

13. See note 1 above.

14. Fr. Sergii Bulgakov, Agnets Bozhii (Paris, 1933), p. 191 ff. (in Russian). French translation, Du Verbe Incarne (Paris, 1943).

15. Dr. Spindler was the only student of the problem using the proper historical method in handling the texts.

16. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Liturgie Cosmique: Maxime le Confesseur (Paris, Aubier, 1947), pp. 204-205; Father Balthasar quotes Qu. ad Talass. 60 and adds that St. Maximus would have taken the Scotist side in the scholastic controversy, yet with an important qualification: "Maxime de reste est totalement etranger au postulat de ce debat scholastique qui imagine la possibilite d'un autre ordre du monde sans pecho et totalement irreel. Pour lui la 'volonte preexistante' de Dieu est identique au monde des 'idees' et des 'possibles': l'ordre des essences et l'ordre des faits coincident en ce point supreme" (in the German edition, Kosmische Liturgie, s. 267-268). See also Dom Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., "The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor" in Studia Anselmiana (Romae, 1955), fasc. 36, ch. 4, pp. 155ff.

17. The best exposition of the theology of St. Maximus is by S. L. Epifanovich, St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine Theology (Kiev, 1915; in Russian); cf. also the chapter on St. Maximus in my book, The Byzantine Fathers (Paris, 1933), pp. 200-227 (in Russian). In addition to the book of Father von Balthasar, quoted above, one may consult with profit the "Introduction" of Dom Polycarp Sherwood to his translation of The Four Centuries on Charity of St. Maximus, Ancient Christian Writers, No. 21 (London and Westminster, Md., 1955). See also Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Lund, 1965).

18. See the definition of "theologoumena" by Bolotov, Thesen iiber das "Filioque," first published without the name of the author ("von einem russischen Theologen") in Revue Internationale de Thiologie, No. 24 (Oct.-Dec, 1898), p. 682: "Man kann fragen, was ich unter Theologou-menon verstehe? Seinem Wesen nach ist es auch eine theologische Meinung, aber eine theologische Meinung derer, welche fiir einen jeden 'Katholiken' mehr bedeuten als gewohnliche Theologen; es sind die theologische Meinungen der hi. Vater der einen ungeteilten Kirche; es sind die Meinungen der Manner, unter denen auch die mit Recht hoi didaskaloi tes oikoumenes genannten sich befinden." No "theologoumenon" can claim more than "probability," and no "theologoumenon" should be accepted if it has been clearly disavowed by an authoritative or "dogmatic" pronouncement of the Church.

A Visual Look at Orthodoxy

You Tube has an excellent video that gives one a small sampling of the visuals of the Orthodox Church. I recommend it.

Hat tip to Fr.. John.

Florence & the Filioque

Al Kimel has posted an article over at Pontifications on the Council of Florence and the Filioque. I am sure this will pop up for discussion on Sacramentum Vitae (Micheal Liccione’s blog is now hosting discussions from Pontifications). Two words of caution. First the article is not short. But the really good ones never are. And secondly if you want to check out the certain to follow debate take an aspirin before doing so. It’s bound to get deep.

The Roman Storm over Rod Dreher

The Roman Catholic part of the internet is throwing something of a fit over the conversion of one of their own to Orthodoxy. I had not planned on commenting on the conversion of Rod Dreher, the conservative columnist and blogger for a couple of reasons. First, it’s a personal matter between him and God. And secondly because commenting on it would inevitably require at least a brief discussion of what by his own admission was a significant factor in his move. Specifically the sexual abuse scandal in the Roman Catholic Church. And there is just no way to talk about that without writing some blunt and possibly hurtful things.

However after reading an incredibly obnoxious article from the Catholic web site The Cafeteria is Closed I have decided a few comments need to be put out.. Gerald Augustinus posted a withering blast at Dreher which I almost stopped reading after I finished the first sentence. The offending sentence was…

“Roman Sacristan tells me that Rod Dreher, a right-wing writer (Dallas Morning News, National Review) who used to be Catholic (convert) has jumped ship and joined an Orthodox church (personal take: for me it'd be absurd to join, say, the Russian Orthodox church without being Russian).”

That told me right off the bat that I was not dealing with an intellectual giant and I had better take my heart burn medicine. Most of what followed was a venomous attack on Dreher and his motives, which I am not going to go into detail on since it’s been hashed out all over the Catholic blogosphere. However, near the end of his screed Mr. Augustinus extends his venom to the Orthodox Church with the following…

“He joined a societally irrelevant, small church. No wonder they all agree. Small size, smaller problems. It's similar to running off to the SSPX - hey, it's 50 of us and we're all USDA Prime orthodox, baby! In the end, the logical consequence would be to start a "church of one". No one else around, no one to disagree with! It's a lot more courageous to stay with a huge Church.”

To which I posted the following (admittedly less than Irenic) response at the bottom of seventy some odd mainly viscous attacks on Dreher’s character and faith.

“(personal take: for me it'd be absurd to join, say, the Russian Orthodox church without being Russian).” And…

“He joined a societally irrelevant, small church. No wonder they all agree. Small size, smaller problems. It's similar to running off to the SSPX - hey, it's 50 of us and we're all USDA Prime orthodox, baby! In the end, the logical consequence would be to start a "church of one". No one else around, no one to disagree with! It's a lot more courageous to stay with a huge Church.”

I don’t even know where to begin with such breathtaking declarations of intellectual bankruptcy. As an Orthodox Christian I can only excuse these inane statements on the basis of a term used by +Pius XII… “invincible ignorance.” I guess it’s a good thing that your views of our irrelevant church (of 250+ million people) are not held by your last several popes. These sorts of snarky comments are what I normally expect from our radical Old Calendarists in reference to the Roman Church. And I will add that some of the comments in here are so shocking that I wonder at how the authors have the effrontery to call themselves Christians. I will stop here out of charity.

What angers me more than the ignorant and insulting comments about the Orthodox Church, is the almost total disregard for the fact that the leaders and clergy of HIS church (and mine at one time) deeply wounded a man to the depths of his soul. While there is a passing acknowledgment of this it clearly carries no weight with the author. As a former Roman Catholic who left for reasons that had nothing at all to do with the scandals in the Latin Church, I can say that evil does not reside in just one church. We have our own problems in Orthodoxy. Although nothing even remotely as serious as this monumental abuse of trust and authority on the part of many (maybe even a majority) of the American Catholic bishops.

But Rod was directly involved in the investigation into this snake pit. There is an expression common in Orthodoxy that it might have been well if Rod had heard before he dove into this dark world. “The floor of Hell is paved with the skulls of bishops.” At the risk of sounding polemic against my former church (which I still admire in many ways), I sincerely hope there is an especially warm room reserved for many of the Roman Catholic Bishops who allowed this evil to go on unchecked and even facilitated it. If I were one of them I would be making arrangements to be buried in an asbestos cassock.

Lives were destroyed. At least a few of the kids committed suicide! And the full weight and power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy was brought to bear in an effort to suppress any knowledge of this and to keep their dirty little secret well covered up. It is unimaginable that anyone coming into contact with this evil could not be left spiritually scarred for life. That Rod was eventually left empty and revolted by his own church is not surprising. That he stayed as long as he did having come face to face with these monsters running his church is.

That Gerald and the vast majority of the others who posted their own damning judgments below his article seem so casual in the acknowledgment of the horror perpetrated by the hierarchs of their own church is stunning. They seem utterly unconcerned with the spiritual harm done not only to Rod Dreher but to all of the thousands of victims (many of whom have lost their faith entirely). This strikes me as simply callous.

Catholics have every right to criticize someone who departs from what they believe to be The Church. But Rod Dreher now believes that he has found The Church elsewhere. One may criticize his judgment. Thats fair and it can be done in ways that are not offensive. (See the linked articles below.) But I think it’s outside of bounds to attack his character or his integrity unless you have walked in his shoes and waded waste deep through the filth that has infested the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States for God only knows how long. How many of his critics have interviewed the kids who were raped while going to confession? Do any of them have a window into his soul? I think they would do well to recall the words…

"He who busies himself with the sins of others, or judges his brother on suspicion, has not yet even begun to repent or to examine himself so as to discover his own sins... " St. Maximos the Confessor (3rd century on Love #55)

For a much more temperate and intelligent discussion of this issue from the Catholic perspective I would refer the reader to the excellent articles posted by Al Kimel over at Pontificatrions and Michael Liccione over on Sacramentum Vitae.

St. Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers (part 3)

Archpriest George Florovsky

St. Gregory Palamas and Theosis.

All these preliminary considerations are highly relevant for our immediate purpose. What is the theological legacy of St. Gregory Palamas? St. Gregory was not a speculative theologian. He was a monk and a bishop. He was not concerned about abstract problems of philosophy, although he was well trained in this field too. He was concerned solely with problems of Christian existence. As a theologian, he was simply an interpreter of the spiritual experience of the Church. Almost all his writings, except probably his homilies, were occasional writings. He was wrestling with the problems of his own time. And it was a critical time, an age of controversy and anxiety. Indeed, it was also an age of spiritual renewal.

St. Gregory was suspected of subversive innovations by his enemies in his own time. This charge is still maintained against him in the West. In fact, however, St. Gregory was deeply rooted in tradition. It is not difficult to trace most of his views and motives back to the Cappadocian Fathers and to St. Maximus the Confessor, who was, by the way, one of the most popular masters of Byzantine thought and devotion. Indeed, St. Gregory was also intimately acquainted with the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. He was rooted in the tradition. Yet, in no sense was his theology just a "theology of repetition." It was a creative extension of ancient tradition. Its starting point was Life in Christ.

Of all themes of St. Gregory's theology let us single out but one, the crucial one, and the most controversial. What is the basic character of Christian existence? The ultimate aim and purpose of human life was defined in the Patristic tradition as θεωσις [theosis, divinization]. The term is rather offensive for the modern ear. It cannot be adequately rendered in any modern language, nor even in Latin. Even in Greek it is rather heavy and pretentious. Indeed, it is a daring word. The meaning of the word is, however, simple and lucid. It was one of the crucial terms in the Patristic vocabulary. It would suffice to quote at this point but St. Athanasius. Γεγονεν γαρ ανθρωπος, ιν ημας εν εαυτω θεοποιηση. [He became man in order to divinize us in Himself. (Ad Adelphium 4)]. Αυτος γαρ ενηνθρωπησεν, ινα ημεις θεοποιηθωμεν. [He became man in order that we might be divinized (De Incarnatione 54)]. St. Athanasius actually resumes here the favourite idea of St. Irenaeus: qui propter immensam dilectionem suam factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod est ipse. [Who, through his immense love became what we are, that He might bring us to be even what He is Himself (Adv. Haeres. V, Praefatio)]. It was the common conviction of the Greek Fathers. One can quote at length St. Gregory of Nazianzus. St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Maximus, and indeed St. Symeon the New Theologian. Man ever remains what he is, that is — creature. But he is promised and granted, in Christ Jesus, the Word become man, an intimate sharing in what is Divine: Life Everlasting and incorruptible. The main characteristic of theosis is, according to the Fathers, precisely "immortality" or "incorruption." For God alone "has immortality" — ο μονος εχων αθανασιαν (I Tim. 6:16). But man now is admitted into an intimate "communion" with God, through Christ and by the power of the Holy Spirit. And this is much more than just a "moral" communion, and much more than just a human perfection. Only the word theosis can render adequately the uniqueness of the promise and offer. The term theosis is indeed quite embarrassing, if we would think in "ontological" categories. Indeed, man simply cannot "become" god. But the Fathers were thinking in "personal" terms, and the mystery of personal communion was involved at this point. Theosis meant a personal encounter. It is that intimate intercourse of man with God, in which the whole of human existence is, as it were, permeated by the Divine Presence. [5]

Yet, the problem remains: How can even this intercourse be compatible with the Divine Transcendance? And this is the crucial point. Does man really encounter God, in this present life on earth? Does man encounter God, truly and verily, in his present life of prayer? Or, is there no more than an actio in distans? The common claim of the Eastern Fathers was that in his devotional ascent man actually encounters God and beholds His eternal Glory. Now, how is it possible, if God "abides in the light unapproachable"? The paradox was especially sharp in the Eastern theology, which has been always committed to the belief that God was absolutely "incomprehensible" — ακαταληπτος — and unknowable in His nature or essence. This conviction was powerfully expressed by the Cappadocian Fathers, especially in their struggle against Eunomius, and also by St. John Chrysostom, in his magnificent discourses Περι Ακαταληπτου. Thus, if God is absolutely "unapproachable" in His essence, and accordingly His essence simply cannot be "communicated," how can theosis be possible at all? "One insults God who seeks to apprehend His essential being," says Chrysostom. Already in St. Athanasius we find a clear distinction between God's very "essence" and His powers and bounty: Και εν πασι μεν εστι κατά την εαυτου αγαθοτητα, εξω δε των παντων παλιν εστι κατά την ιδιαν φυσιν. [He is in everything by his love, but outside of everything by his own nature (De Decretis II)]. The same conception was carefully elaborated by the Cappadocians. The "essence of God" is absolutely inaccessible to man, says St. Basil (Adv. Eunomium 1:14). We know God only in His actions, and by His actions: "Ημεις δε εκ μεν των ενεργειων γνωριζειν λεγομεν τον Θεον ημων, τη δε ουσια προσεγγιζειν ουχ υπισχνουμεθα αι μεν γαρ ενεργειαι αυτου προς ημας καταβαινουσιν, η δε ουσια αυτου μενει απροσιτος." [We say that we know our God from his energies (activities), but we do not profess to approach his essence — for his energies descend to us, but his essence remains inaccessible[Ημεις δε εκ μεν των ενεργειων (Epist. 234, ad Amphilochium)]. Yet, it is a true knowledge, not just a conjecture or deduction: αι ενεργειαι αυτου προς ημας καταβαινουσιν. In the phrase of St. John of Damascus, these actions or "energies" of God are the true revelation of God Himself: η θεια ελλαμψις και ενεργεια (De Fide Orth. 1: 14). It is a real presence, and not merely a certain praesentia operativa, sicut agens adest ei in quod agit [as the actor is present in the thing in which he acts]. This mysterious mode of Divine Presence, in spite of the absolute transcendence of the Divine Essence, passes all understanding. But it is no less certain for that reason.

St. Gregory Palamas stands in an ancient tradition at this point. In His "energies" the Unapproachable God mysteriously approaches man. And this Divine move effects encounter: προοδος εις τα εξω, in the phrase of St. Maximus (Scholia in De Div. Nom., 1: 5).

St. Gregory begins with the distinction between "grace" and "essence": η θεια και θεοποιος ελλαμψις και χαρις ουκ ουσια, αλλ’ ενεργεια εστι Θεου [the Divine and Divinizing illumination and grace is not the essence, but the energy of God; Capita Phys., Theol., etc., 68-9]. This basic distinction was formally accepted and elaborated at the Great Councils in Constantinople, 1341 and 1351. Those who would deny this distinction were anathematized and excommunicated. The anathematisms of the council of 1351 were included in the rite for the Sunday of Orthodoxy, in the Triodion. Orthodox theologians are bound by this decision. The essence of God is absolutely αμεθεκτη [incommunicable]. The source and the power of human theosis is not the Divine essence, but the "Grace of God": θεοποιος ενεργεια, ης τα μετεχοντα θεουνται, θεια τις εστι χαρις, αλλ’ ουχ η φυσις του Θεου [the divinizing energy, by participation of which one is divinized, is a divine grace, but in no way the essence of God; ibid. 92-3]. Charis [χαρις] is not identical with the ousia [ουσια]. It is θεια και ακτιστος χαρις και ενεργεια [Divine and uncreated Grace and Energy; ibid., 69]. This distinction, however, does not imply or effect division or separation. Nor is it just an "accident," ουτε συμβεβηκοτος (ibid., 127). Energies "proceed" from God and manifest His own Being. The term προιεναι [proienai, proceed] simply suggests διακρισιν [distinction], but not a division: ει και διενηνοχε της φυσεως, ου διασπαται η του Πνευματος χαρις [the grace of the Spirit is different from the Substance, and yet not separated from; Theophan, p. 940].

Actually the whole teaching of St. Gregory presupposes the action of the Personal God. God moves toward man and embraces him by His own "grace" and action, without leaving that φος απροσιτον [light unapproachable], in which He eternally abides. The ultimate purpose of St. Gregory's theological teaching was to defend the reality of Christian experience. Salvation is more than forgiveness. It is a genuine renewal of man. And this renewal is effected not by the discharge, or release, of certain natural energies implied in man's own creaturely being, but by the "energies" of God Himself, who thereby encounters and encompasses man, and admits him into communion with Himself. In fact, the teaching of St. Gregory affects the whole system of theology, the whole body of Christian doctrine. It starts with the clear distinction between "nature" and "will" of God. This distinction was also characteristic of the Eastern tradition, at least since St. Athanasius. It may be asked at this point: Is this distinction compatible with the "simplicity" of God? Should we not rather regard all these distinctions as merely logical conjectures, necessary for us, but ultimately without any ontological significance? As a matter of fact, St. Gregory Palamas was attacked by his opponents precisely from that point of view. God's Being is simple, and in Him even all attributes coincide. Already St. Augustine diverged at this point from the Eastern tradition. Under Augustinian presuppositions the teaching of St. Gregory is unacceptable and absurd. St. Gregory himself anticipated the width of implications of his basic distinction. If one does not accept it, he argued, then it would be impossible to discern clearly between the "generation" of the Son and "creation" of the world, both being the acts of essence, and this would lead to utter confusion in the Trinitarian doctrine. St. Gregory was quite formal at that point.

If according to the delirious opponents and those who agree with them, the Divine energy in no way differs from the Divine essence, then the act of creating, which belongs to the will, will in no way differ from generation (γενναν) and procession (εκπορευειν), which belong to the essence. If to create is no different from generation and procession, then the creatures will in no way differ from the Begotten (γεννηματος) and the Projected (προβληματος). If such is the case according to them, then both the Son of God and the Holy Spirit will be no different from creatures, and the creatures will all be both the begotten (γεννηματα) and the projected (προβληματα) of God the Father, and creation will be deified and God will be arrayed with the creatures. For this reason the venerable Cyril, showing the difference between God's essence and energy, says that to generate belongs to the Divine nature, whereas to create belongs to His Divine energy. This he shows clearly saying, "nature and energy are not the same." If the Divine essence in no way differs from the Divine energy, then to beget (γενναν) and to project (εκπορευειν) will in no way differ from creating (ποιειν). God the Father creates by the Son and in the Holy Spirit. Thus He also begets and projects by the Son and in the Holy Spirit, according to the opinion of the opponents and those who agree with them. (Capita 96 and 97.)

St. Gregory quotes St. Cyril of Alexandria. But St. Cyril at this point was simply repeating St. Athanasius. St. Athanasius, in his refutation of Arianism, formally stressed the ultimate difference between ουσια [ousia, essence] or φυσις [physis, substance], on the one hand, and the βουλησις [boulesis, will], on the other. God exists, and then He also acts. There is a certain "necessity" in the Divine Being, indeed not a necessity of compulsion, and no fatum, but a necessity of being itself. God simply is what He is. But God's will is eminently free. He in no sense is necessitated to do what He does. Thus γεννησις [gennesis, generation] is always κατά φυσιν [kata physin, according to essence], but creation is a βουλησεος εργον [bouleseos ergon, energy of the will] (Contra Arianos III. 64-6). These two dimensions, that of being and that of acting, are different, and must be clearly distinguished. Of course, this distinction in no way compromises the "Divine simplicity." Yet, it is a real distinction, and not just a logical device. St. Gregory was fully aware of the crucial importance of this distinction. At this point he was a true successor of the great Athanasius and of the Cappadocian hierarchs.

It has been recently suggested that the theology of St. Gregory, should be described in modern terms as an "existentialist theology." Indeed, it differed radically from modern conceptions which are currently denoted by this label. Yet, in any case, St. Gregory was definitely opposed to all kinds of "essentialist theologies" which fail to account for God's freedom, for the dynamism of God's will, for the reality of Divine action. St. Gregory would trace this trend back to Origen. It was the predicament of the Greek impersonalist metaphysics. If there is any room for Christian metaphysics at all, it must be a metaphysics of persons. The starting point of St. Gregory's theology was the history of salvation: on the larger scale, the Biblical story, which consisted of Divine acts, culminating in the Incarnation of the Word and His glorification through the Cross and Resurrection; on the smaller scale, the story of the Christian man, striving after perfection, and ascending step by step, till he encounters God in the vision of His glory. It was usual to describe the theology of St. Irenaeus as a "theology of facts." With no lesser justification we may describe also the theology of St. Gregory Palamas as a "theology of facts."

In our own time, we are coming more and more to the conviction that "theology of facts" is the only sound Orthodox theology. It is Biblical. It is Patristic. It is in complete conformity with the mind of the Church.

In this connection we may regard St. Gregory Palamas as our guide and teacher, in our endeavour to theologize from the heart of the Church.

Endnotes.

1. It has been recently suggested that Gnostics were actually the first to invoke formally the authority of an "Apostolic Tradition" and that it was their usage which moved St. Irenaeus to elaborate his own conception of Tradition. D. B. Reynders, "Paradosis: Le proges de l'idee de tradition jusqu'a Saint Irenee," in Recherches de Theologie ancienne et medievale, V (1933), Louvain, 155-191. In any case, Gnostics used to refer to "tradition."

2. Paul Maas, ed.. Fruhbyzantinische Kirchenpoesie, I (Bonn, 1910), p. 24.

3. Louis Bouyer, "Le renouveau des etudes patristiques," in La Vie Intellectuelle, XV (Fevrier 1947), 18.

4. Mabillon, Bernardi Opera, Praefatio generalis, n. 23 (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, c. 26).

5. Cf. M. Lot-Borodine, "La doctrine de la deification dans I'Eglise grecque jusqu'au XI siecle," in Revue de l'histoire des religions, tome CV, Nr I (Janvier-Fevrier 1932), 5-43; tome CVI, Nr 2/3 (Septembre-Decembre 1932), 525-74; tome CVII, Nr I (Janvier-Fevrier 1933), 8-55.

St. Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers (part 2)

The Meaning of the “Age” of the Fathers.

Now, we have reached the crucial point. The name of "Church Fathers" is usually restricted to the teachers of the Ancient Church. And it is currently assumed that their authority depends upon their "antiquity," upon their comparative nearness to the "Primitive Church," to the initial "Age" of the Church. Already St. Jerome had to contest this idea. Indeed, there was no decrease of "authority," and no decrease in the immediacy of spiritual competence and knowledge, in the course of Christian history. In fact, however, this idea of "decrease" has strongly affected our modern theological thinking. In fact, it is too often assumed, consciously or unconsciously, that the Early Church was, as it were, closer to the spring of truth. As an admission of our own failure and inadequacy, as an act of humble self-criticism, such an assumption is sound and helpful. But it is dangerous to make of it the starting point or basis of our "theology of Church history," or even of our theology of the Church. Indeed, the Age of the Apostles should retain its unique position. Yet, it was just a beginning. It is widely assumed that the "Age of the Fathers" has also ended, and accordingly it is regarded just as an ancient formation, "antiquated" in a sense and "archaic." The limit of the "Patristic Age" is variously defined. It is usual to regard St. John of Damascus as the "last Father" in the East, and St. Gregory the Dialogos or Isidore of Seville as "the last" in the West. This periodization has been justly contested in recent times. Should not, for instance, St. Theodore of Studium, at least, be included among "the Fathers"? Mabillon has suggested that Bernard of Clairvaux, the Doctor mellifluous, was "the last of the Fathers, and surely not unequal to the earlier ones." [4] Actually, it is more than a question of periodization. From the Western point of view "the Age of the Fathers" has been succeeded, and indeed superseded, by "the Age of the Schoolmen," which was an essential step forward. Since the rise of Scholasticism "Patristic theology" has been antiquated, has become actually a "past age," a kind of archaic prelude. This point of view, legitimate for the West, has been, most unfortunately, accepted also by many in the East, blindly and uncritically. Accordingly, one has to face the alternative. Either one has to regret the "backwardness" of the East which never developed any "Scholasticism" of its own. Or one should retire into the "Ancient Age," in a more or less archeological manner, and practice what has been wittily described recently as a "theology of repetition." The latter, in fact, is just a peculiar form of imitative "scholasticism."

Now, it is not seldom suggested that, probably, "the Age of the Fathers" has ended much earlier than St. John of Damascus. Very often one does not proceed further than the Age of Justinian, or even already the Council of Chalcedon. Was not Leontius of Byzantium already "the first of the Scholastics"? Psychologically, this attitude is quite comprehensible, although it cannot be theologically justified. Indeed, the Fathers of the Fourth century are much more impressive, and their unique greatness cannot be denied. Yet, the Church remained fully alive also after Nicea and Chalcedon. The current overemphasis on the "first five centuries" dangerously distorts theological vision, and prevents the right understanding of the Chalcedonian dogma itself. The decree of the Sixth Ecumenical Council is often regarded as a kind of an "appendix" to Chalcedon, interesting only for theological specialists, and the great figure of St. Maximus the Confessor is almost completely ignored. Accordingly, the theological significance of the Seventh Ecumenical Council is dangerously obscured, and one is left to wonder, why the Feast of Orthodoxy should be related to the commemoration of the Church's victory over the Iconoclasts. Was it not just a "ritualistic controversy"? We often forget that the famous formula of the Consensus quinquesaecularis [agreement of five centuries], that is, actually, up to Chalcedon, was a Protestant formula, and reflected a peculiar Protestant "theology of history." It was a restrictive formula, as much as it seemed to be too inclusive to those who wanted to be secluded in the Apostolic Age. The point is, however, that the current Eastern formula of "the Seven Ecumenical Councils" is hardly much better, if it tends, as it usually does, to restrict or to limit the Church's spiritual authority to the first eight centuries, as if "the Golden Age" of Christianity has already passed and we are now, probably, already in an Iron Age, much lower on the scale of spiritual vigour and authority. Our theological thinking has been dangerously affected by the pattern of decay, adopted for the interpretation of Christian history in the West since the Reformation. The fullness of the Church was then interpreted in a static manner, and the attitude to Antiquity has been accordingly distorted and misconstrued. After all, it does not make much difference, whether we restrict the normative authority of the Church to one century, or to five, or to eight. There should he no restriction at all. Consequently, there is no room for any "theology of repetition." The Church is still fully authoritative as she has been in the ages past, since the Spirit of Truth quickens her now no less effectively as in the ancient times.

The Legacy of Byzantine Theology.

One of the immediate results of our careless periodization is that we simply ignore the legacy of Byzantine theology. We are prepared, now more than only a few decades ago, to admit the perennial authority of "the Fathers," especially since the revival of Patristic studies in the West. But we still tend to limit the scope of admission, and obviously "Byzantine theologians" are not readily counted among the "Fathers." We are inclined to discriminate rather rigidly between "Patristics" — in a more or less narrow sense — and "Byzantinism." We are still inclined to regard "Byzantinism" as an inferior sequel to the Patristic Age. We have still doubts about its normative relevance for theological thinking. Now, Byzantine theology was much more than just a "repetition" of Patristic theology, nor was that which was new in it of an inferior quality in comparison with "Christian Antiquity." Indeed, Byzantine theology was an organic continuation of the Patristic Age. Was there any break? Has the ethos of the Eastern Orthodox Church been ever changed, at a certain historic point or date, which, however, has never been unanimously identified, so that the "later" development was of lesser authority and importance, if of any? This admission seems to be silently implied in the restrictive commitment to the Seven Ecumenical Councils. Then, St. Symeon the New Theologian and St. Gregory Palamas are simply left out, and the great Hesychast Councils of the fourteenth century are ignored and forgotten. What is their position and authority in the Church?

Now, in fact, St. Symeon and St. Gregory are still authoritative masters and inspirers of all those who, in the Orthodox Church, are striving after perfection, and are living the life of prayer and contemplation, whether in the surviving monastic communities, or in the solitude of the desert, and even in the world. These faithful people are not aware of any alleged "break" between "Patristics" and "Byzantinism." The Philokalia, this great encyclopaedia of Eastern piety, which includes writings of many centuries, is, in our own days, increasingly becoming the manual of guidance and instruction for all those who are eager to practice Orthodoxy in our contemporary situation. The authority of its compiler, St. Nicodemus of the Holy Mount, has been recently recognized and enhanced by his formal canonization in the Church. In this sense, we are bound to say, "the Age of the Fathers" still continues in "the Worshipping Church." Should it not continue also in our theological pursuit and study, research and instruction? Should we not recover "the mind of the Fathers" also in our theological thinking and teaching? To recover it, indeed, not as an archaic manner or pose, and not just as a venerable relic, but as an existential attitude, as a spiritual orientation. Only in this way can our theology be reintegrated into the fullness of our Christian existence. It is not enough to keep a "Byzantine Liturgy," as we do, to restore Byzantine iconography and Byzantine music, as we are still reluctant to do consistently, and to practice certain Byzantine modes of devotion. One has to go to the very roots of this traditional "piety," and to recover the "Patristic mind". Otherwise we may be in danger of being inwardly split — as many in our midst actually are — between the "traditional" forms of "piety" and a very untraditional habit of theological thinking. It is a real danger. As "worshippers" we are still in "the tradition of the Fathers." Should we not stand, conscientiously and avowedly, in the same tradition also as "theologians," as witnesses and teachers of Orthodoxy? Can we retain our integrity in any other way? (Cont)

-G. Florovksy

Quote of the Day

"Should have at least tried the SSPX before going over to schism."

- Freeper Fast Ed97 commenting on the recent conversion of conservative online blogger and former Roman Catholic Rod Dreher to Orthodoxy.

St. Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers (part 1)

Following the Fathers...

"Following THE HOLY FATHERS"... It was usual in the Ancient Church to introduce doctrinal statements by phrases like this. The Decree of Chalcedon opens precisely with these very words. The Seventh Ecumenical Council introduces its decision concerning the Holy Icons in a more elaborate way: "Following the Divinely inspired teaching of the Holy Fathers and the Tradition of the Catholic Church." The didaskalia of the Fathers is the formal and normative term of reference.

Now, this was much more than just an "appeal to antiquity." Indeed, the Church always stresses the permanence of her faith through the ages, from the very beginning. This identity, since the Apostolic times, is the most conspicuous sign and token of right faith — always the same. Yet, "antiquity" by itself is not an adequate proof of the true faith. Moreover, the Christian message was obviously a striking "novelty" for the "ancient world," and, indeed, a call to radical "renovation." The "Old" has passed away, and everything has been "made New." On the other hand, heresies could also appeal to the past and invoke the authority of certain "traditions." In fact, heresies were often lingering in the past. [1] Archaic formulas can often be dangerously misleading. Vincent of Lerins himself was fully aware of this danger. It would suffice to quote this pathetic passage of his: "And now, what an amazing reversal of the situation! the authors of the same opinion are adjudged to be catholics, but the followers — heretics; the masters are absolved, the disciples are condemned; the writers of the books will be children of the Kingdom, their followers will go to Gehenna" (Commonitorium, cap. 6). Vincent had in mind, of course, St. Cyprian and the Donatists. St. Cyprian himself faced the same situation. "Antiquity" as such may happen to be just an inveterate prejudice: nam antiquitas sine veritate vetustas erroris est (Epist. 74). It is to say — "old customs" as such do not guarantee the truth. "Truth" is not just a "habit."

The true tradition is only the tradition of truth, traditio veritatis. This tradition, according of St. Irenaeus, is grounded in, and secured by, that charisma veritatis certum [secure charisma of truth], which has been "deposited" in the Church from the very beginning and has been preserved by the uninterrupted succession of episcopal ministry. "Tradition" in the Church is not a continuity of human memory, or a permanence of rites and habits. It is a living tradition — depositum juvenescens, in the phrase of St. Irenaeus. Accordingly, it cannot be counted inter mortuas regulas [among dead rules]. Ultimately, tradition is a continuity of the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church, a continuity of Divine guidance and illumination. The Church is not bound by the "letter." Rather, she is constantly moved forth by the "Spirit." The same Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, which "spake through the Prophets," which guided the Apostles, is still continuously guiding the Church into the fuller comprehension and understanding of the Divine truth, from glory to glory.

"Following the Holy Fathers"… This is not a reference to some abstract tradition, in formulas and propositions. It is primarily an appeal to holy witnesses. Indeed, we appeal to the Apostles, and not just to an abstract "Apostolicity." In the similar manner do we refer to the Fathers. The witness of the Fathers belongs, intrinsically and integrally, to the very structure of Orthodox belief. The Church is equally committed to the kerygma of the Apostles and to the dogma of the Fathers. We may quote at this point an admirable ancient hymn (probably, from the pen of St. Romanus the Melode). "Preserving the kerygma of the Apostles and the dogmas of the Fathers, the Church has sealed the one faith and wearing the tunic of truth she shapes rightly the brocade of heavenly theology and praises the great mystery of piety." [2]

The Mind of the Fathers.

The Church is "Apostolic" indeed. But the Church is also "Patristic." She is intrinsically "the Church of the Fathers." These two "notes" cannot be separated. Only by being "Patristic" is the Church truly "Apostolic." The witness of the Fathers is much more than simply a historic feature, a voice from the past. Let us quote another hymn — from the office of the Three Hierarchs. "By the word of knowledge you have composed the dogmas which the fishermen have established first in simple words, in knowledge by the power of the Spirit, for thus our simple piety had to acquire composition." There are, as it were, two basic stages in the proclamation of the Christian faith. "Our simple faith had to acquire composition." There was an inner urge, an inner logic, an internal necessity, in this transition from kerygma to dogma. Indeed, the teaching of the Fathers, and the dogma of the Church, are still the same "simple message" which has been once delivered and deposited, once for ever, by the Apostles. But now it is, as it were, properly and fully articulated. The Apostolic preaching is kept alive in the Church, not only merely preserved. In this sense, the teaching of the Fathers is a permanent category of Christian existence, a constant and ultimate measure and criterion of right faith. Fathers are not only witnesses of the old faith, testes antiquitatis. They are rather witnesses of the true faith, testes veritatis. "The mind of the Fathers" is an intrinsic term of reference in Orthodox theology, no less than the word of Holy Scripture, and indeed never separated from it. As it has been well said, "the Catholic Church of all ages is not merely a daughter of the Church of the Fathers — she is and remains the Church of the Fathers." [3]

The Existential Character of Patristic Theology.

The main distinctive mark of Patristic theology was its "existential" character, if we may use this current neologism. The Fathers theologized, as St. Gregory of Nazianzus put it, "in the manner of the Apostles, not in that of Aristotle" — αλιευτικως, ουκ αριστοτελικως (Hom. 23. 12). Their theology was still a "message," a kerygma. Their theology was still "kerygmatic theology," even if it was often logically arranged and supplied with intellectual arguments. The ultimate reference was still to the vision of faith, to spiritual knowledge and experience. Apart from life in Christ theology carries no conviction and, if separated from the life of faith, theology may degenerate into empty dialectics, a vain polylogia, without any spiritual consequence. Patristic theology was existentially rooted in the decisive commitment of faith. It was not a self-explanatory "discipline" which could be presented argumentatively, that is aristotelikos, without any prior spiritual engagement. In the age of theological strife and incessant debates, the great Cappadocian Fathers formally protested against the use of dialectics, of "Aristotelian syllogisms," and endeavoured to refer theology back to the vision of faith. Patristic theology could be only "preached" or "proclaimed" — preached from the pulpit, proclaimed also in the words of prayer and in the sacred rites, and indeed manifested in the total structure of Christian life. Theology of this kind can never be separated from the life of prayer and from the exercise of virtue. "The climax of purity is the beginning of theology," as St. John the Klimakos puts it: τελοσ δε αγνειας υποθεσις θεολογιας (Scala Paradisi, grade 30).

On the other hand, theology of this type is always, as it were, "propaideutic," since its ultimate aim and purpose is to ascertain and to acknowledge the Mystery of the Living God, and indeed to bear witness to it, in word and deed. "Theology" is not an end in itself. It is always but a way. Theology, and even the "dogmas," present no more than an "intellectual contour" of the revealed truth, and a "noetic" testimony to it. Only in the act of faith is this "contour" filled with content. Christological formulas are fully meaningful only for those who have encountered the Living Christ, and have received and acknowledged Him as God and Saviour, and are dwelling by faith in Him, in His body, the Church. In this sense, theology is never a self-explanatory discipline. It is constantly appealing to the vision of faith. "What we have seen and have heard we announce to you." Apart from this "announcement" theological formulas are empty and of no consequence. For the same reason these formulas can never be taken "abstractly," that is, out of total context of belief. It is misleading to single out particular statements of the Fathers and to detach them from the total perspective in which they have been actually uttered, just as it is misleading to manipulate with detached quotations from the Scripture. It is a dangerous habit "to quote" the Fathers, that is, their isolated sayings and phrases, outside of that concrete setting in which only they have their full and proper meaning and are truly alive. "To follow" the Fathers does not mean just "to quote" them. "To follow" the Fathers means to acquire their "mind," their phronema. (Cont)

-Archpriest George Florovsky

Some Tridentine Analysis

There is an excellent essay by Shawn Tribe over at The New Liturgical Movement on the various ways the anticipated papal indult for the Missal of Pius V could play out. I strongly recommend it for those interested in the Tridentine Mass and its possible revival in the Latin Church.

Latest from Duke University (yes it's still going on...)

And now for a quick trip back to legal la la land (Durham NC)… MSNBC reports that the other entertainer (that’s a much nicer term for someone in their profession) working with the young woman accusing three Duke University Lacrosse players of rape has accused the alleged vicitm of lying. The source is an interview on 60 Minutes. Since she is described in the police reports as a witness to most of what happened this simply adds yet another nail to the legal coffin for this case. How long is this cruel perversion of justice going to continue?

Update:
The 60 Minutes interview will be broadcast in its entirety this Sunday on CBS. The New York Times also published a story on this today.

The authority of the ancient councils and the tradition of the Fathers (part 3)

Archpriest George Florovsky

The meaning of the appeal to the Fathers

It has been rightly observed that appeal to "antiquity" was changing its function and character with the course of time. The Apostolic past was still at hand, and within the reach of human memory, in the times of St. Irenaeus or Tertullian. Indeed, St. Irenaeus had heard in his youth the oral instruction of St. Polycarp, the immediate disciple of St. John the Divine. It was only the third generation since Christ! The memory of the Apostolic age was still fresh. The scope of Christian history was brief and limited. The main concern in this early age was with the Apostolic foundations, with the initial delivery of the kerygma. Accordingly, Tradition meant at that time, primarily, the original "delivery" or "deposition." The question of accurate transmission, over a bit more than one century, was comparatively simple, especially in the Churches founded by the Apostles themselves. Full attention was given, of course, to the lists of episcopal succession (cf. St. Irenaeus or Hegesippus), but it was not difficult to compile these lists. The question of "succession," however, appeared to be much more complicated for the subsequent generations, more removed from the Apostolic time. It was but natural, under these new conditions, that emphasis should shift from the question of initial "Apostolicity" to the problem of the preservation of the "deposit." Tradition came to mean "transmission," rather than "delivery." The question of the intermediate links, of "succession" — in the wide and comprehensive sense of the word — became especially urgent. It was the problem of faithful witnesses. It was in this situation that the authority of the Fathers was for the first time formally invoked: they were witnesses of the permanence or identity of the kerygma, as transmitted from generation to generation (Cf. P. Smulders, "Le mot et le concept de tradition chez les Pères," Recherches de Science religieuse, 40 (1952), 41-62, and Yves Congar, La Tradition et les traditions, Etude historique (Paris 1960), p. 57 ff). Apostles and Fathers — these two terms were generally and commonly coupled together in the argument from Tradition, as it was used in the Third and Fourth centuries. It was this double reference, both to the origin and to the unfailing and continuous preservation, that warranted the authenticity of belief. On the other hand, Scripture was formally acknowledged and recognized as the ground and foundation of faith, as the Word of God and the Writ of the Spirit. Yet, there was still the problem of right and adequate interpretation. Scripture and Fathers were usually quoted together, that is, kerygma and exegesis, i grafi ke i pateres (η γραφη και οι πατερες).

The reference, or even a direct appeal, "to the Fathers" was a distinctive and salient note of theological research and discussion in the period of the great General or Ecumenical Councils, beginning with that of Nicea. The term has never been formally defined. It was used, occasionally and sporadically, already by early ecclesiastical writers. Often it simply denoted Christian teachers and leaders of previous generations. It was gradually becoming a title for the bishops, in so far as they were appointed teachers and witnesses of faith. Later the title was applied specifically to bishops in Councils. The common element in all these cases was the teaching office or task. "Fathers" were those who transmitted and propagated the right doctrine, the teaching of the Apostles, who were guides and masters in Christian instruction and catechesis. In this sense it was emphatically applied to great Christian writers. It must be kept in mind that the main, if not also the only, manual of faith and doctrine was, in the Ancient Church, precisely the Holy Writ. And for that reason the renowned interpreters of Scripture were regarded as "Fathers" in an eminent sense [See, first of all, J. Fessler, Institutiones Patrologiae, denuo recensuit, auxit, edidit B. Jungmann, I (Innsbruck, 1890), pp. 15-57; E. Amann, "Pères de 1’église," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, XII, cc. 1192-1215; Basilius Steidle, O.S.B., "Heilige Vaterschaft," Benedictinische Monatsschrift, XIV (1932), 215-226; "Unsere Kirchenväter," ibidem, 387-398 and 454-466]. "Fathers" were teachers, first of all, — doctores, didaskali (διδασκαλοι). And they were teachers in so far as they were witnesses, testes. These two functions must be distinguished, and yet they are most intimately intertwined. "Teaching" was an Apostolic task: "teach all nations." And it was in this commission that their "authority" was rooted: it was, in fact, the authority to bear witness. Two major points must be made in this connection. First, the phrase "the Fathers of the Church" has actually an obvious restrictive accent: they were acting not just as individuals, but rather as viri ecclesiastici (the favourite expression of Origen), on behalf and in the name of the Church. They were spokesmen for the Church, expositors of her faith, keepers of her Tradition, witnesses of truth and faith, — magistri probabiles, in the phrase of St. Vincent. And in that was their "authority" grounded [Cf. Basilius Steidle, Patrologia (Friburgi Brisg., 1937), p. 9: qui saltem aliquo tempore per vinculum fidei et caritatis Ecclesiae adhaeserunt testesque sunt veritatis catholicae]. It leads us back to the concept of "representation." The late G. L. Prestige has rightly observed:

The creeds of the Church grew out of the teaching of the Church: the general effect of heresy was rather to force old creeds to be tightened up than to cause fresh creeds to be constructed. Thus the most famous and most crucial of all creeds, that of Nicea, was only a new edition of an existing Palestinian confession. And a further important fact always ought to be remembered. The real intellectual work, the vital interpretative thought, was not contributed by the Councils that promulgated the creeds, but by the theological teachers who supplied and explained the formulae which the Councils adopted. The teaching of Nicea, which finally commended itself, represented the views of intellectual giants working for a hundred years before and for fifty years after the actual meeting of the Council (G. L. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics (London, 1940), p. 8. Italics are mine).

The Fathers were true inspirers of the Councils, while being present and in absentia, and also often after they have gone to Eternal Rest. For that reason, and in this sense, the Councils used to emphasize that they were "following the Holy Fathers" (επομενοι τοις αγιος πατρασιν), as Chalcedon has said. Secondly, it was precisely the consensus patrum which was authoritative and binding, and not their private opinions or views, although even they should not be hastily dismissed. Again, this consensus was much more than just an empirical agreement of individuals. The true and authentic consensus was that which reflected the mind of the Catholic and Universal Church — to ekklisiastikon fronima (το εκκλησιοστικον φρονημα) [See Eusebius, hist. eccl., V. 28.6, quoting an anonymous treatise, Against the heresy of Artemon, of the third century. The attribution of this treatise to Hippolytus is doubtful]. It was that kind of consensus to which St. Irenaeus was referring when he contended that neither a special "ability," nor a "deficiency" in speech of individual leaders in the Churches could affect the identity of their witness, since the "power of tradition" — virtus traditionis — was always and everywhere the same (adv. haeres. I. 10.2) . The preaching of the Church is always identical: constans et aequaliter perseverans (ibid., III. 24.1). The true consensus is that which manifests and discloses this perennial identity of the Church’s faith — aequaliter perseverans.

[See my article "Offenbarung, Philosophie and Theologie," Zwischen den Zeiten, IX (1931), pp. 463-480. — Cf. Karl Adam, Christus unser Bruder (1926), p. 116 f.: Der konservative Traditionsgeist der Kirche fliesst unmittelbar aus ihrer christozentrischen Grundhaltung. Von dieser Grundstellung aus wandte sich die Kirche von jeher gegen die Tyrannie von Führerpersönlichkeiten, von Schulen und Richtungen. Da, wo durch diese Schulen das christliche Bewusstsein, die überlieferte Botschaft von Christus, getrübt oder bedroht schien, da zögerte sie nicht, selbst über ihre grössten Söhne hinwegzuschreiten, über einen Origenes, Augustin, ja — hier und dort — selbst über einen Thomas von Aquin. Und überall da, wo grundsätzlich nicht die Überlieferung, nicht das Feststehen auf dem Boden der Geschichte, der urchristlichen Gegebenheit, der lebendigen fortdauernden Gemeinschaft, sondern die eigene Spekulation and das eigene kleine Erlebnis and das eigene arme Ich zum Träger der Christusbotschaft gemacht werden sollte, da sprach sie umgehend ihr Anathema aus ... Die Geschichte der kirchlichen Verkündigung ist nichts anderes als ein zähes Festhalten an Christus, eine folgestrenge Durchführung des Gebotes Christi: Nur einer sei eurer Lehrer, Christus. — Actually, this pathetic passage is almost a paraphrase of the last chapter of the (first) Commonitorium of St. Vincent, in which he sharply discriminates between the common and universal mind of the Church and the privatae opiniunculae of individuals: quidquid vero, quamquis ille sanctus et doctus, quamvis episcopus, quamvis confessor et martyr, praeter omnes aut etam contra omnes senserit (cap. XXVII)].

The teaching authority of the Ecumenical Councils is grounded in the infallibility of the Church. The ultimate "authority" is vested in the Church which is for ever the Pillar and the Foundation of Truth. It is not primarily a canonical authority, in the formal and specific sense of the term, although canonical strictures or sanctions may be appended to conciliar decisions on matters of faith. It is a charismatic authority, grounded in the assistance of the Spirit: for it seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us.

Tragedy in New York

As anyone who has been near a TV knows, a small plane crashed into a high rise condominium building in New York City today. Although many for understandable reasons feared terrorism at first, it quickly has become more likely that this was a tragic accident. Now reports have been broadcast that the plane was owned by New York Yankees relief pitcher Cory Lidle. Although his fate has not been confirmed it certainly does not look good at this point. This is obviously a terrible loss for his family and loved ones as also for the Yankees and their fans. Prayers are asked for all those affected by today's sad events.

Update: At 1853 EST
It has been confirmed that Cory Lidle was on the plane and did not survive. One other person was also aboard and has perished. Memory Eternal!

Tridentine News

It has been a while since I posted anything on the subject of the classical rite of the Roman Liturgy. There were numerous rumors floating around earlier this year that Pope +Benedict XVI had signed or was preparing to sign a universal indult (permission) for the use of the 1500 year old liturgy by any priest of the Roman Rite. And there was some serious disappointment in many circles (and some relief in others) when this did not materialize as rumors had suggested during the Latin Holy Week. I said then that I felt strongly that some sort of permission was very likely to come and the timing was not as important as what was produced.

In the last couple of months the rumor mill has once again been shifting into high gear. Sometime in November has been speculated as the new date for the indult to be issued. In the last few weeks many Traditionalist blogs and web sites such as Rorate Caeli have been giving guardedly optimistic reports that something was stirring. I have deliberately refrained from posting on this subject in order to wait for some form of confirmation from more reliable sources. However today it appears that this “rumor” is no longer a rumor. It’s also not quite a formal announcement, but the mainstream press has reported that something is coming. The Times of London and CWN have both reported that some form of liberalization is imminent with respects to the pre-Vatican II Missale Romanum.

Obviously this is good news for the Roman Church, and the answer to many prayers. But what does it mean for Orthodoxy? I think this is a positive move which will help to create an atmosphere more conducive to the restoration of theological orthodoxy (small “o”) in the western church. As most know there has been much concern in Orthodoxy about the chaos in the pews and even within the clergy that has been widespread since Vatican II. Lex orandi, lex credendi, is the traditional rule. If people start praying and worshiping according to a more orthodox form it can not but help the unfortunate situation in the Roman Catholic Church. For now however we should simply wait and see. As I have said many times, until it’s issued by the Vatican with the Pope’s signature, all of these reports and rumors + .50 cents will get you a (small) cup of coffee.

The NLCS: My predictions...

OK. If baseball is not your cup of tea just skip this and move down to the article by Florovsky on the Church & Tradition that I am posting in installments.

For those of you who are still reading, the St. Louis Cardinals are being welcomed to Shea Stadium in the Big Apple tonight. I hope that their visit will be memorable. The National League Championship Series will end with either the Cards or the Mets going to the World Series. The Mets as I am sure you will recall swept the Dodgers in the Division Series playoffs (with only 1 credible starting pitcher!). Now they are looking to make their first trip to the World Series since 2000 when they lost to the other team from NY (their name escapes me). So how is this going to go you ask?

Well a quick look can give us some points of comparison between the two clubs. The Cards have a respectable offense but it pales next to the Mets who have the most lethal line up in the National League. The Card’s first baseman Albert Pujols is their most dangerous hitter. The problem is that he is the bulk of their offense. The Mets have a very deep and dangerous line up and have repeatedly shown that no one outside of the pitcher can be seen as a weak link. If we (I am a Mets fan for those of you just joining us from your home planet) can avoid giving Pujols the opportunity to inflict any serious damage we should be good. In pitching I think there is a slight advantage to the Cards, but not a huge one given what they are facing. I would be more worried about our pitching deficiencies (and they are very real) if the Cards had a better line up. But if the Mets bullpen, the best in the major leagues, can hold up I think we will be ok. The Cards do get an edge in their manager. Tony La Russa is one of the best. Don’t get me wrong. I think Willie Randolph has worked a minor miracle with the Mets. But La Russa has been in the post season as a manager more often than I have been in the drive through at our local McDonalds. If all goes well in the future Willie might be able to make that claim one day. But for now Tony La Russa gets the edge in managers. One fun thing to watch will be the much anticipated clash between Jose Reyes (aka the human bullet) and Yadier Molina who is arguably one of the best defensive catchers in baseball. Molina is not an offensive threat. But he has gunned down almost half(!) of all would be base thieves that tried while he was catching. Reyes on the other hand is used to just assuming that if he reaches first he will also get second, by hook or by crook. And his stats have thus far supported that view. The Mets typically regard a base hit by Reyes as just a slightly delayed double.

One often overlooked area of importance is team spirit. Here the advantage is solidly Mets. These guys have been playing, and winning all year while plagued with injuries and other problems. It’s a team made up with an impressive combination of young guys and veterans many of whom have never been in the post season much less the World Series. But there are veterans who have been there and done that. What is driving the Mets is a combination of cohesion and esprit de corps. A few years back (in the dark ages) when the Mets were not doing so hot, someone asked Chipper Jones of the Atlanta Braves why they were doing so well against the Mets who had on paper an impressive collection of players. Jones replied “We have a team.” That’s what exists now for the Mets. These guys are not just talented. They also like each other and support each other when one is down for one reason or another. If a player has been hurt or slumping all year there has been someone (or often multiple someones) who stepped up and filled the void or propped up the team / player. This is a team that works well together and has one driving goal. They want a ring.

John’s prediction: Mets in 5

The authority of the ancient councils and the tradition of the Fathers (part 2)

[Again apologies for the format. I do not feel comfortable altering the original text even by breaking it into paragraphs.]

Christ: the criterion of truth

There is no easy answer to this query. Indeed, there is a very simple answer — Christ is the Truth. The source and the criterion of the Christian Truth is the Divine Revelation, in its twofold structure, in its two dispensations. The source of the Truth is the Word of God. Now, this simple answer was readily given and commonly accepted in the Ancient Church, as it may be also gratefully accepted in the divided Christendom of our own days. Yet, this answer does not solve the problem. In fact, it has been variously assessed and interpreted, to the point of most radical divergence. It only meant that the problem was actually shifted a step further. A new question came to be asked. How was Revelation to be understood? The Early Church had no doubt about the "sufficiency" of the Scriptures, and never tried to go beyond, and always claimed not to have gone beyond. But already in the Apostolic age itself the problem of "interpretation" arose in all its challenging sharpness. What was the guiding hermeneutical principle? At this point there was no other answer than the appeal to the "faith of the Church," the faith and kerygma of the Apostles, the Apostolic paradosis. The Scripture could be understood only within the Church, as Origen strongly insisted, and as St. Irenaeus and Tertullian insisted before him. The appeal to Tradition was actually an appeal to the mind of the Church, her phronema. It was a method to discover and ascertain the faith as it had been always held, from the very beginning: semper creditum. The permanence of Christian belief was the most conspicuous sign and token of its truth: no innovations [For further discussion of this topic see my articles: "The Function of Tradition in the Ancient Church," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, IX (No. 2, 1964), 181-200, and "Scripture and Tradition: An Orthodox point of view," Dialog, II (No. 4, 1963), 288-293. Cf. also "Revelation and Interpretation," in: Biblical Authority for Today, edited by Alan Richardson and W. Schweitzer (London and Philadelphia, 1951), pp. 163-180]. And this permanence of the Holy Church’s faith could be appropriately demonstrated by the witnesses from the past. It was for that reason, and for that purpose, that "the ancients," i palei (οι παλαιοι), were usually invoked and quoted in theological discussions. This "argument from antiquity," however, had to be used with certain caution. Occasional references to old times and casual quotations from old authors could be often ambiguous and even misleading. This was well understood already at the time of the great Baptismal controversy in the third century, and the question about the validity or authority of "ancient customs" had been formally raised at that time. Already Tertullian contended that consuetudines [customs] in the Church had to be examined in the light of truth: Dominus noster Christus veritatem se, non consuetudinem, cognominavit [Our Lord Christ designated himself, not as custom but as truth; de virginibus velandis, I.I]. The phrase was taken up by St. Cyprian and was adopted by the Council at Carthage in 256. In fact, "antiquity" as such might happen to be no more than an inveterate error: nam antiquitas sine veritate vetustas erroris est [for antiquity without truth is the age old error], in the phrase of St. Cyprian (epist. 74.9). St. Augustine also used the same phrase: In Evangelio Dominus, Ego sum, inquit, veritas. Non dixit, Ego sum consuetudo [In the Gospel the Lord says — "I am the truth." He did not say — I am custom; de baptismo, III. 6.9]. "Antiquity" as such was not necessarily a truth, although the Christian truth was intrinsically an "ancient" truth, and "innovations" in the Church had to be resisted. On the other hand, the argument "from tradition" was first used by the heretics, by Gnostics, and it was this usage of theirs that prompted St. Irenaeus to elaborate his own conception of Tradition — in opposition to the false "traditions" of the heretics which were alien to the mind of the Church [See B. Reynders, "Paradosis, Le progrès de l’idée de tradition jusqu’à Saint Irénee," Recherches de théologie ancienne el mediévale, V (1933), 155-191, and "La polemique de Saint Irénée," ibidem, VII (1935), 5-27]. The appeal to "antiquity" or "traditions" had to be selective and discriminative. Certain alleged "traditions" were simply wrong and false. One had to detect and to identify the "true Tradition," the authentic Tradition which could be traced back to the authority of the Apostles and be attested and confirmed by an universal consensio of Churches. In fact, however, this consensio could not be so easily discovered. Certain questions were still open. The main criterion of St. Irenaeus was valid: Tradition — Apostolic and Catholic (or Universal). Origen, in the preface to his De Principiis, tried to describe the scope of the existing "agreement" which was to his mind binding and restrictive, and then he quoted a series of important topics which had to be further explored. There was, again, a considerable variety of local traditions, in language and discipline, even within the unbroken communion in faith and in sacris. It suffices to recall at this point the Pascal controversy between Rome and the East, in which the whole question of the authority of ancient habits came to the fore. One should also recall the conflicts between Carthage and Rome, and also between Rome and Alexandria, in the third century, and the increasing tension between Alexandria and Antioch which came to its tragic climax, and impass, in the fifth century. Now, in this age of the intense theological controvercy and context, all participating groups used to appeal to tradition and "antiquity." "Chains" of ancient testimonies were compiled on all sides in the dispute. These testimonies had to be carefully scrutinized and examined on a basis more comprehensive that "antiquity" alone. Certain local traditions, liturgical and theological, were finally discarded and disavowed by the overarching authority of an "ecumenical" consensus. A sharp confrontation of diverse theological traditions took place already at the Council of Ephesus. The Council was actually split in twain — the "Ecumenical" Council of St. Cyril and Rome and the conciliabulum of the Orient. Indeed, the reconciliation was achieved, and yet there was still a tension. The most spectacular instance of condemnation of a theological tradition, of long standing and of considerable, if rather local, renown, was, of course, the dramatic affair of Three Chapters. At this point a question of principle has been raised: to what extent was it fair and legitimate to disavow the faith of those who had died in peace and in communion with the Church? There was a violent debate on this matter, especially in the West, and strong arguments were produced against such retrospective discrimination. Nevertheless, the Chapters were condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council. "Antiquity" was overruled by Ecumenical consensio, as strained as it probably was. (Cont)

What is Orthodoxy?

We can define Orthodoxy in no better way than in the words of the great 18th-century Russian Father, St. Tikhon of Zadonsk -- a Saint whose fervent spirit is needed very much today by Orthodox Christians. We should read him more and practice what he teaches. St. Tikhon calls Orthodoxy "the true Christianity," and he wrote a whole book under this title. But "true Christianity" does not mean just having the right opinions about Christianity -- this is not enough to save one's soul.

St. Tikhon in his book, in the chapter on "The Gospel and Faith," says: "If someone should say that true faith is the correct holding and confession of correct dogmas, he would be telling the truth, for a believer absolutely needs the Orthodox holding and confession of dogmas. But this knowledge and confession by itself does not make a man a faithful and true Christian. The keeping and confession of Orthodox dogmas is always to be found in true faith in Christ, but the true faith of Christ is not always to be found in the confession of Orthodoxy... The knowledge of correct dogmas is in the mind, and it is often fruitless, arrogant, and proud... The true faith in Christ is in the heart, and it is fruitful, humble, patient, loving, merciful, compassionate, hungering and thirsting for righteousness; it withdraws from worldly lusts and clings to God alone, strives and seeks always for what is heavenly and eternal, struggles against every sin, and constantly seeks and begs help from God for this." And he then quotes Blessed Augustine, who teaches: "The faith of a Christian is with love; faith without love is that of the devil" ("True Christianity," ch. 287, p. 469). St. James in his Epistle tells us that "the demons also believe and tremble" (James 3:19).

St. Tikhon, therefore, gives us a start in understanding what Orthodoxy is: it is something first of all of the heart, not just the mind, something living and warm, not abstract and cold, some thing that is learned and practiced in life, not just in school.

-Hieromonk Seraphim Rose of Platina, from a lecture given shortly before his repose.

The authority of the ancient councils and the tradition of the Fathers (part 1)

Fathers of the 7th Ecumenical Council

Archpriest George Florovsky

The councils in the early Church

The scope of this essay is limited and restricted. It is no more than an introduction. Both subjects — the role of the Councils in the history of the Church and the function of Tradition — have been intensively studied in recent years. The purpose of the present essay is to offer some suggestions which may prove helpful in the further scrutiny of documentary evidence and in its theological assessment and interpretation. Indeed, the ultimate problem is ecclesiological. The Church historian is inevitably also a theologian. He is bound to bring in his personal options and commitments. On the other hand, it is imperative that theologians also should be aware of that wide historical perspective in which matters of faith and doctrine have been continuously discussed and comprehended. Anachronistic language must be carefully avoided. Each age must be discussed on its own terms.

The student of the Ancient Church must begin with the study of particular Councils, taken in their concrete historical setting, against their specific existential background, without attempting any overarching definition in advance. Indeed, it is precisely what historians are doing. There was no "Conciliar theory" in the Ancient Church, no elaborate "theology of the Councils," and even no fixed canonical regulations. The Councils of the Early Church, in the first three centuries, were occasional meetings, convened for special purposes, usually in the situation of urgency, to discuss particular items of common concern. They were events, rather than an institution. Or, to use the phrase of the late Dom Gregory Dix, "in the pre-Nicene times Councils were an occasional device, with no certain place in the scheme of Church government [Dom Gregory Dix, "Jurisdiction, Episcopal and Papal, in the Early Church," Laudate, XVI (No. 62, June 1938), 108]. Of course, it was commonly assumed and agreed, already at that time, that meeting and consultation of bishops, representing or rather personifying their respective local churches or "communities," was a proper and normal method to manifest and to achieve the unity and consent in matters of faith and discipline. The sense of the Unity of the Church was strong in Early times, although it had not yet been reflected on the organizational level. The "collegiality" of the bishops was assumed in principle and the concept of the Episcopatus unus was already in the process of formation. Bishops of a particular area used to meet for the election and consecration of new bishops. Foundations had been laid for the future Provincial or Metropolitan system. But all this was rather a spontaneous movement. It seems that "Councils" came into existence first in Asia Minor, by the end of the second century, in the period of intensive defense against the spread of the "New Prophecy," that is, of the Montanist enthusiastic explosion. In this situation it was but natural that the main emphasis should be put on "Apostolic Tradition," of which bishops were guardians and witnesses in their respective paroikiai. It was in North Africa that a kind of Conciliar system was established in the third century. It was found that Councils were the best device for witnessing, articulating, and proclaiming the common mind of the Church and the accord and unanimity of local churches. Professor Georg Kretschmar has rightly said, in his recent study on the Councils of the Ancient Church, that the basic concern of the Early Councils was precisely with the Unity of the Church: "Schon von ihrem Ursprung her ist ihr eigentliches Thema aber das Ringen um die rechte, geistliche Einheit der Kirche Gottes" [Georg Kretschmar, "Die Konzile der Alten Kirche," in: Die ökumenischen Konzile der Christenheit, hg. v. H. J. Margull, Stuttgart (1961), p. 1]. Yet, this Unity was based on the identity of Tradition and the unanimity in faith, rather than on any institutional pattern.

The imperial or ecumenical council

The situation changed with the Conversion of the Empire. Since Constantine, or rather since Theodosius, it has been commonly assumed and acknowledged that Church was co-extensive with Commonwealth, that is, with the Universal Empire which has been christened. The "Conversion of the Empire" made the Universality of the Church more visible than ever before. Of course, it did not add anything to the essential and intrinsic Universality of the Christian Church. But the new opportunity provided for its visible manifestation. It was in this situation that the first General Council was convened, the Great Council of Nicea. It was to become the model for the later Councils. "The new established position of the Church necessitated ecumenical action, precisely because Christian life was now lived in the world which was no longer organized on a basis of localism, but of the Empire as a whole … Because the Church has come out into the world the local churches had to learn to live no longer as self-contained units (as in practice, though not in theory, they have largely lived in the past), but as parts of a vast spiritual government" (Dom Gregory Dix, op. cit., p. 113). In a certain sense the General Councils as inaugurated at Nicea may be described as "Imperial Councils," die Reichskonzile, and this was probably the first and original meaning of the term "Ecumenical" as applied to the Councils (See Eduard Schwartz, "Über die Reichskonzilien von Theodosius bis Justinian" (1921), reprinted in his Gesammelte Schriften, IV (Berlin, 1960), pp. 111-158). It would be out of place now to discuss at any length the vexed and controversial problem of the nature or character of that peculiar structure which was the new Christian Commonwealth, the theocratic Res publica Christiana, in which the Church was strangely wedded with the Empire [Cf. my article, "Empire and Desert: Antinomies of Christian History," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, III (No. 2, 1957), 133-159]. For our immediate purpose it is actually irrelevant. The Councils of the fourth century were still occasional meetings, or individual events, and their ultimate authority was still grounded in their conformity with the "Apostolic Tradition." It is significant that no attempt to develop a legal or canonical theory of "General Councils," as a seat of ultimate authority, with specific competence and models of procedure, was made at that time, in the fourth century, or later, although they were de facto acknowledged as a proper instance to deal with the questions of faith and doctrine and as an authority on these matters. It will be no exaggeration to suggest that Councils were never regarded as a canonical institution, but rather as occasional charismatic events. Councils were not regarded as periodical gatherings which had to be convened at certain fixed dates. And no Council was accepted as valid in advance, and many Councils were actually disavowed, in spite of their formal regularity. It is enough to mention the notorious Robber Council of 449. Indeed, those Councils which were actually recognized as "Ecumenical," in the sense of their binding and infallible authority, were recognized, immediately or after a delay, not because of their formal canonical competence, but because of their charismatic character: under the guidance of the Holy Spirit they have witnessed to the Truth, in conformity with the Scripture as handed down in Apostolic Tradition [See V. V. Bolotov, Lectures on the History of the Ancient Church, III (1913), p. 320 ff. (Russian), and his Letters to A. A. Kireev, ed. by D. N. Jakshich (1931), pp. 31 ff. (Russian); also A. P. Dobroklonsky, "The Ecumenical Councils of the Orthodox Church. Their Structure," Bogoslovlje, XI (2 & 3, 1936), 163-172 and 276-287 (Serbian.)]. There is no space now to discuss the theory of reception. In fact, there was no theory. There was simply an insight into the matters of faith. Hans Küng, in his recent book, Strukturen der Kirche, has suggested a helpful avenue of approach to this very problem. Indeed, Dr. Küng is not a historian, but his theological scheme can be fruitfully applied by historians. Küng suggested that we should regard the Church herself as a "Council," an Assembly, and as a Council convened by God Himself, aus göttlicher Berufung, and the historic Councils, that is, the Ecumenical or General Councils, as Councils aus menschlicher Berufung, as a "representation" of the Church, — indeed, a "true representation," but yet no more than a representation [Hans Küng, Strukturen der Kirche, 1962, pp. 11-74]. It is interesting to note that a similar conception had been made already many years ago by the great Russian Church historian, V. V. Bolotov, in his Lectures on the History of the Ancient Church. Church is ecclesia, an assembly, which is never adjourned [Bolotov, Lectures, I (1907), pp. 9-14]. In other words, the ultimate authority — and the ability to discern the truth in faith — is vested in the Church which is indeed a "Divine institution," in the proper and strict sense of the word, whereas no Council, and no "Conciliar institution," is de jure Divino, except in so far as it happens to be a true image or manifestation of the Church herself. We may seem to be involved here in a vicious circle. We may be actually involved in it, if we insist on formal guarantees in doctrinal matters. But, obviously, such "guarantees" do not exist and cannot be produced, especially in advance. Certain "Councils" were actually failures, no more than conciliabula, and did err. And for that reason they were subsequently disavowed. The story of the Councils in the fourth century is, in this respect, very instructive [Cf. Monald Goemans, O.F.M., Het algemeene Concilie in de vierde eeuw (Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1945)]. The claims of the Councils were accepted or rejected in the Church not on formal or "canonical" ground. And the verdict of the Church has been highly selective. The Council is not above the Church; this was the attitude of the Ancient Church. The Council is precisely a "representation." This explains why the Ancient Church never appealed to "Conciliar authority" in general or in abstracto, but always to particular Councils, or rather to their "faith" and witness. Pere Yves Congar has recently published an excellent article on the "Primacy of the first four Ecumenical Councils," and the evidence he has collected is highly instructive [Primauté des quatre premiers conciles oecuméniques," Le Concile et les Conciles, Contribution à l’histoire de la vie conciliaive de l’Eglise (1960), p. 75-109]. In fact, it was precisely the normative priority of Nicea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon, that is, of their dogmatic ruling, which was felt to be a faithful and adequate expression of the perennial commitment of faith as once delivered unto the Church. Again the stress was not so much on "canonical" authority, but on the truth. It leads us to the most intricate and crucial problem — what are the ultimate criteria of the Christian Truth? (cont)

Eastern Rite Catholic Customs & Orthodoxy

Over at the Byzantine Forum (a recent addition to my linked sites in the left column) there is a very interesting discussion on the way Byzantine Catholics do business by comparison to Orthodox. From my own (admittedly limited) experience in the Eastern Rite on my way to Orthodoxy, I can confirm most of the observations made by the various posters. This raises the question of why Eastern Rite Catholics seem to have lost touch with traditional practices and forms of worship common to Eastern Christians.

In the parish I attended before moving to California people rarely venerated the icon before the Royal Doors (or any icons for that matter), the doors stayed open throughout the liturgy, and I never once saw anyone do a full prostration in the church. I did one once, but the looks I got made me decide on the spot that it was not a good idea. They have Saturday vigil liturgy, no vespers or matins, just liturgy. Confession is in a room that is clearly a Roman Catholic confessional in all but name, complete with screen. I could go on but I am sure you get the point. This is not a shot at Eastern Rite Catholics. It’s rather the observation of a tragic loss to their spiritual patrimony. Rome can condemn Latinization all they want, but the reality is that it’s a done deal. Very few BCs seem to possess what we would call an Orthodox Phronema. For all of my above noted complaints, I should say that the Byzantine Rite was like a drink of ice cold water for my soul after the long struggle in the desert that is much of the modern Latin Church. For those Catholics who are stuck in a comer of the world where the choices in RC parishes are something between bad and just awful, I can enthusiastically recommend the Byzantine Rite (or any other Eastern Catholic Rite Church) as being generally a safe haven from the worst abuses in the Latin Rite.

On a related point, this particular thread was posted under the topic of the “Revised Divine Liturgy!” The very idea of that makes me cringe. And judging from the posts on the forum it would seem most of the BCs there feel the same way. Why exactly does the Divine Liturgy of St. John require revision? Liturgical Renewal perhaps? Now there is another term guaranteed to make the skin crawl and the hair stand on end for any one familiar with the splendid results of that in the Latin Church. Lord Have Mercy!